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Our  present  energy  dilemma  has  been  created  by  a  series  of
major  policy  misadventures  in  several  areas  during  the  past  ten
or twelve  years.  These  areas  are:  (1) our  oil  import  policy;  (2)
our research  policies,  particularly  concerning  fossil  fuels;  (3) our
basic  data  programs;  and  (4)  our  natural  gas  regulations.  From
1962  to  1967  I was  responsible  for  the oil  import policy.  During
that period  and  later  as  Director of the  Bureau  of Mines  I was
responsible  for research  policy  and  for  basic  data policy.  While
I  was  with the Federal  Power Commission  I was responsible  for
the  regulation  of natural  gas  at  wellheads.  I  have  now  moved
to the Atomic  Energy  Commission and  I wish you  all well.
My  task is  to bring  you an overview  of energy.  The  best way
to encapsulate  my view is to regard energy as a strategic commod-
ity.  If we  are  out of zinc,  we  can  switch  to aluminum,  but  only
if  we  have  the  additional  electric  power  required  to  make  the
aluminum.  If we  are  out of  aluminum,  we  can  switch  to  steel,
but  again  only  if we  have  the  needed  electric  power  where  we
need  it.  If we  are  out of coal,  we  can  switch  to  oil,  if we  have
the needed  energy  resources.  But  we  cannot  do  without  energy.
We  can  look  upon  our  economic  situation,  or  that  of  any
individual, community, or country,  as being the result of its ability
to  control  and  use  energy.  If we  look  at  U.S.  history  over the
last  hundred  years,  there  is  virtually  a  one-to-one  correlation
between  increased  energy  consumption  and  increased  gross
national  product  in  real terms.  If we  look over the  world  at  any
given  time,  we also find a good correlation between the per capita
energy  consumption  of  any  country  and  its  per  capita  gross
national  product.
Energy  consumption  is  thus  the  counterpart  of our  material
standard of living.  The  present  situation consequently  represents
a  serious  threat  to  our  well-being.  Over the  next  generation  we
will  have  to  repair  our public  policies  and  change  our  individual
feelings and attitudes toward the overall energy picture.  Otherwise
we will begin to fail as a nation. We may have started to fail already
because of our misunderstanding  of this essential  commodity.
Since  the end of World War II our economy has been charac-
5terized  by  a  totally  unconstrained  use  of energy.  I  recall  that  as
a  child  I  was  constantly  being  reminded  by  my  parents  to  turn
off the lights because electricity was relatively expensive.  Electric-
ity  became  cheap  after  World  War  II  as  we  reaped  the  benefits
of economies  of scale  in  producing  it.  Similarly,  as  technology
advanced  in the  oil,  coal mining,  and  natural  gas  businesses,  we
found that supplies began pressing on the market, and those energy
sources also dropped  in price.  From  1947 to  1970  the cost of coal
dropped  by  something  like  50  percent  in  real terms.  The cost  of
natural  gas  at  the  point  of usage  also  fell  markedly.  We  began
to  look upon  energy  as virtually  a  free  good.  We  began  to  make
economic decisions that were liberal in use of energy but conserva-
tive  in use of other forms of capital.
Our casual attitude  toward  energy supply  is  shown  also  in the
inefficiency  with which  we  have  used  it.  Take  oil,  for  example.
Starting  with the  oil  reservoir,  we  recover  on the  average  about
30  percent  of the  oil  in  place.  If the  price  were  higher,  or our
technological  efforts  greater,  that  percentage  would  increase.  In
fact,  it  has  been  increasing  by  about  1 to  1.5  percent  per  year.
It was just over  15  percent  at the end of World War  II.
In  converting  oil  into  electrical  energy,  our  system  is  about
32 percent efficient.  Combining this with our 30 percent recovery,
we  are  now  down  to  about  10  percent  of the  energy  in  place.
We  then  run  the  electricity  through  a  notoriously  inefficient  dis-
tribution  system,  losing  another  2  or 3 percentage  points  in  the
process.  Finally,  we may apply the electricity  to lighting by means
of incandescent  lights,  from  which  we  get  more  heat  than  light.
Overall,  this  entire  chain  is  perhaps  4  percent  efficient,  from  oil
in  the ground  to light  in the  home,  relative  to the energy  initially
in place.
In  every  step  of the  oil  use  chain  great  economies  could  be
made without  much effort.  The 4 percent  could  be about doubled
simply  by  shifting  from incandescent  to  fluorescent  lights  and  by
tightening  the distribution  system to  eliminate  some of the losses
that we now have.  The 32 percent efficiency  in converting  oil into
electrical  energy  could  be raised  with known technology  to about
40  percent.  By  advanced  technology  now  in  the  pilot  stage  we
could  get  into  the low  50's,  almost  a 40  percent  increase  in  effi-
ciency.  Economic  and  technical  possibilites  exist for  raising  the
present  30  percent  initial recovery  of oil  to  at least  the  60's  and
possibly,  later on,  into the  80's.
We  have  not  made  these  efforts  to  raise  efficiency  because
we  have  regarded  our energy sources  as being superabundant,  no
6matter  how  we  abuse  them.  Notwithstanding  our  abuse  during
this long period from  1947 to  1970, more and more energy became
available  at  ever-increasing  prices.  It is  now clear,  however,  that
all  this  time  we  were  incurring  a  deficit.  We  will  be  paying  for
that deficit for a long time to come.
We misregulated  natural gas  because  under the circumstances
we  had  no  alternative  but  to  hold  down  price.  The  natural  gas
industry  is  composed  of  three  segments:  production,  long-line
transmission,  and local  distribution.  Before  1900 local distribution
of manufactured gas was controlled. Lower than free market prices
were created by virtue of that control.  After  1938  long-line trans-
mission  companies  began  to  be  controlled  with  economic  regula-
tions,  and again economic  rents were  created.  From  1938 to  1948
abundant supplies of natural gas were pressing on the market.  But
after  1948  the  supply  and  demand  relationship  changed,  and  all
the  economic  rents that  had been created  by  the regulation  of the
production  and  transmission  began  to  migrate  back  into  the  fuel
price.  The  price  of natural  gas,  which  was  commonly  four  cents
per cubic foot in  1948 and  1949, had risen to twenty-one or twenty-
two  cents by  1951,  a remarkable turnaround  for so short a period.
About  1954,  as  a  result  of the  Phillips  decision,  the  Federal
Power Commission had no choice  but to begin to  regulate natural
gas prices.  That created substantial  demand.  Natural gas  became
the  fuel  of choice  for  economic  reasons,  not  only  in  homes  but
also  in  industry.  In  fact,  65  percent  of our natural  gas  now  goes
into  industrial  uses  and  only  about  35  percent  into  commercial
and household uses.  About half of our natural  gas is used for pur-
poses  which  could  easily  be  switched  to  other  fuels.  When  we
look  back  on  this  period  of natural  gas  regulation,  we  can  see
the errors.  But in  my judgment  the errors  were not  in influencing
the supply side. Our error was in failure to have counterpart regula-
tions to  restrain demand.
The oil import  control program  is another area where  it is  now
evident  that  errors  were  made.  Here  we  began  what  Dave
Freeman  has  described  as  the policy  of drain  America  first.  We
limited  oil  imports,  but  we  did not try to  force  additional  invest-
ment  in  research  and  exploration  in  the  United  States.  We  did
not follow through.
Some statistics are interesting here.  In  1965  we were consuming
about  11  million  barrels  a  day  and  importing  2.5  million  barrels
a  day.  We  had  about  4  million  barrels  a  day  of excess  capacity.
By  1970  excess  capacity  was  essentially  zero.  Our  demand  was
up  to  about  13  million  barrels  a  day,  but  because  of oil  import
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a  day.  All that  we  accomplished  during  the period  of oil  import
controls was to  hasten the depletion of domestic reserves.
Our  basic  data began  some  years  ago  to  give  signals  of the
current  situation  that  were  pretty  easily  perceived  by  experts.  In
1967  and  1968  I was  making  public  statements  to  congressional
committees  that we were  about  to enter a  period of severe  energy
shortages.  But  it  was  difficult  for  people  to  believe  the  signals
we were  getting because the data came from suspect sources.  Our
oil data came  from the oil  industry.  Our nuclear  data  came  from
the Atomic Energy  Commission.  The gas  data came  from the gas
industry.  The  coal  data came  from  the  Bureau  of Mines,  which
was  regarded  as  a  captive  of the  coal  industry.  We  were  getting
our  data  free,  and  they  were  worth just  about  what  we  paid  for
them because  nobody believed them.
People do not believe the data even now. There is still a broadly
based  quarrel  in  Washington  about whether there  is  a natural  gas
shortage.  Some  experts  are  willing  to  testify  that  we  have  a
conspiracy,  that  the  oil  companies  are  shutting  down  their  gas
supplies  and  not delivering  them  to  market  in  the  expectation  of
eventual  regulation.
Finally,  our research  policy has  been,  in  retrospect,  disgrace-
ful.
In  1947  two  significant  research  and  development  actions
began.  The first was the establishment of a civilian Atomic Energy
Commission  leading  to  the  development  of atomic  energy  as  an
additional  energy  option.  The  second  was  the  Synthetic  Liquid
Fuels  Act  which  bestowed  on  the  Secretary  of the  Interior  the
authority to go out and look at oil shales, coal,  and other resources
in  the United States,  in  order to  develop new  supplemental fuels.
The  atomic  energy  activities  culminated  in  a  viable  industry.
It  is reaching the point where  we can see nuclear power providing
10 to  15  percent of our electricity  requirements  by the  late  1970's
and  as  much  as  60  percent  by  the  year  2000.  That  is  a  success
story.
The  Synthetic  Liquid  Fuels  Act was  not a  success  story.  The
petroleum  industry argued  that  the federal  government  should not
conduct  research  that  would  increase  interfuel  competition.  The
Eisenhower  administration  went  along  with  the  industry,  and  in
1954  funding  for  the  act  was  terminated.  If the  synthetic  liquid
fuels program had been pursued with the same vigor as  the nuclear
energy  program  was pursued by  the Atomic  Energy  Commission,
8we  would  probably  have  seen  a  continuation  of the  relatively
orderly  transition  from  one  source  of energy  supply  to  another
which  has characterized  the  history of energy consumption  in  the
world.
The  period  of orderly  transition  in  this  country  begins  with
animal power, which was our predominant  source of energy before
the  Civil  War.  During  and  after  the  Civil  War  we  went  to  coal,
which  was  king  for  close  to  a  hundred  years.  Then  oil  became
the  predominant  resource,  followed  by  gas  in  the  1940's.  Now
we  are  suffering  a  hiatus  in  terms  of a  further  smooth  transition
because  national  polices  have  fallen  out of step  with market  and
technical realities.
One of the areas where  policy has fallen  out  of step is  prices.
A  guide  for  our  oil  import  control  program  was  stable  product
prices. The unstated premise  was that we would protect our crude
oil market but  would not allow  a rise in gasoline prices.  That has
been  a  key  element  in  bringing  about  the  current  gasoline  and
heating  oil dilemma.
The present  shortage  is often  attributed to the inability  to find
sites  for refineries  because  of environmental  considerations.  The
fact  is  that  we  can  site  refineries  in  the  Southwest  and  the
Southeast  without  difficulty.  Louisiana,  for example,  is delighted
to have  new refineries  in the tidewater,  as  are  other places  in this
country with tidewater locations.
It was not for purposes of control that the oil companies  refused
to  construct  refineries,  or because  they were  unsure  where  addi-
tional crude  supplies would come from.  They knew that the crude
supplies  would either come  from the outer continental  shelves  of
the  United  States  or  be  imported  in  foreign  bottoms.  Therefore,
they could have located their refineries at tidewater sites and taken
it either way.  But during the last three administrations the oil com-
panies  had  been  jawboned  every  time  they  made  a  price  move.
They  are  now  providing  the  United  States  with  an  object  lesson
in  basic  supply  and  demand  economics.  There  has  now  been  a
three-year  hiatus in the construction of refineries.
I  was myself part of the jawbone exercise.  I incurred  the wrath
of domestic  producers  in  1967  and  1968  and  again  in  1970  and
1971  when  I  was  in  the  Bureau  of Mines  by  trying  to  keep  the
lid  on  prices  as  the  other  side  of the  coin  for  oil  imports.  But
economics  ultimately  will  win  out.  We  drove  margins  down  to
the  point  where  refinery  construction  was  not  attractive.  The  oil
companies  will  not  now  be  able  to  add  capacity  fast  enough  to
9avert  a  crisis  in  heating  oil  supplies  either  this  winter  or next.
The  gasoline  shortage  probably  will  be  worse  next  summer  than
it has been this  summer.
There  are  two  root  problems  in  our  current  policy.  The  first
is the exponential  growth in demand.  Since World  War II we  have
been  on a sky  ride  of energy  consumption.  Overall,  consumption
is going up about  4 percent per year compounded,  which  amounts
to doubling every eighteen years.  No resource base can  stand that.
Let  us look  at  how  demand  growth  has  affected  natural  gas.
At  the  moment  we  have  known  natural  gas  resources  of about
250 trillion cubic feet. The American Gas Association  tells us there
is  yet  another  1,200  trillion  cubic  feet  to  be  found,  which  they
regard  as  plenty.  The  AGA's  estimate  is  the  result  of a  simple
extrapolation  from the explored provinces to the unexplored  prov-
inces  down to a depth of 30,000  feet.  It is  a reasonable projection
of technology for the  next twenty  to thirty  years.
We  consume  25  to  30  billion  cubic  feet  annually.  At  that  rate
of consumption,  the  supplies  estimated  by  the  AGA  would  last
about fifty years.  But this ignores exponential growth.  Since World
War  II  consumption  of natural  gas  has been  rising 7  percent  per
year,  which  means  doubling  every ten  years.  If this were  to con-
tinue,  our demand  for natural  gas  would  be  50  billion  cubic  feet
in  1983 and 100 billion cubic feet in 1993.  At that rate of compound-
ing,  if  we  assume  a  ten-year  dedicated  reserve,  the  last of total
known  reserves  plus  to-be-found  reserves  as  estimated  by  the
AGA  would have  been  committed  by  1985  or  1986.
The  Geological  Survey  estimates that  2,100 billion  cubic  feet
are to be found.  A little greater depth and a little greater extrapola-
tion  out  to  the continental  shelves  and  margins  accounts  for the
difference  between  their  estimate  and  that  of the  AGA.  If the
higher  estimate  proves  correct,  the  total  supply  would  last  for
another  nine years,  until  1994 or  1995.
What  I  am  saying  is  simply  that,  regardless  of how  large  the
resources  seem  from  a  base  year  perspective,  when  exponential
growth  in  demand  is  applied  to  them,  the  supply  disappears  in  a
frighteningly  short  period.  There  is  hardly  any  resource  that  can
outlast six or seven doublings. Consequently,  we  have to ask our-
selves  if we can  sustain basic  growth  at the  current  pace.
At the  moment  we  are  really  not yet  in  a  resources  crisis  in
natural  gas although,  projecting the  situation as  I have just done,
we  probably  will  be  in  a  generation  or  so.  A  little  further  on,
the  same may  happen  with other  resources.  But until  then,  if we
10wanted  to,  we  could  solve  all of our  energy  problems  simply  by
converting  all  American  industry  to  coal  and  burning  it  raw,  if
we  were  willing  to  do  that.  We  have  the  technology.  It  is  just
a matter of changing grates  for the most part.  It would be  disrup-
tive,  but  given  the  time  and  a  national  objective  that  we  were
going  to  convert  everything  to  burning  raw  coal  in three  to  five
years,  we could do it without rippling the economy. The principal
costs would be dirtier air and substantially  higher mortality among
miners.
While  we do not yet have a resources  crisis,  what we  do have
is a crisis created by management failures, a compounding of errors
in policy and  environmental  constraints.
It is worth while  to  spend a minute  looking at public  attitudes
toward  energy because  these must be taken  into account in policy
formation.  These  attitudes  are based,  in part,  on economic,  and,
in part,  on  environmental  considerations.  When  people  think  of
energy  shortages  they think of the  oil companies  as bandits.  The
Federal Trade  Commission  is  now embarked  on another  massive
antitrust suit against eight major oil companies.  I  think that a Gal-
lup  Poll would  show  that  80 or 90  percent of the  people  support
that sort of attack. The oil industry  is just too much;  it is on every
corer. People  do not like oil companies.
The same is true of coal mining companies.  My own experience
in  the  coal  mining  field,  while  I  was  Director  of the  Bureau  of
Mines,  was  associated  with  a  major mining  disaster.  There  was
a  rising  tide  of public  opinion  against  the  coal  mining  industry.
This  is  a  deeply  held  resentment  and  to a  degree justifiable.  The
coal  industry  has  been  cavalier  with  both  people  and  with  land.
It is  unwilling  to reform  itself.
There  is a strong feeling  among the elite that a one-to-one rela-
tionship  exists  between  the  production  and  use  of  energy  and
degradation  of  the  environment.  No  doubt  energy  producing
industries,  concerned  primarily  with  cost,  have  permitted  some
bad  practices,  particularly  those  related  to  air  pollution,  which
have raised  questions in people's minds.  In Santa Barbara we  had
the  outpouring  of public  indignation  at  the  oil  spill.  The  Alaska
pipeline  fight  had  to  be  resolved,  not  in the  courts,  but  through
the  efforts of Congress.  All  the forces  of the  administration  and
all  the  forces  of the  oil  industry  were  turned  loose  on  this.  A
nuclear  moratorium  is  now  being  proposed  by  environmentally
oriented groups.
There  is  a  feeling  that  energy  is  somehow  dissociated  from
our  day-to-day  living.  When  the  fellow  who  says,  "Let's  have
11no  more  Santa  Barbaras,"  goes  into  the  service  station  to fill  up
his  gas tank,  I  do  not  think  he  sees the relationship  at all.  There
is a disassociation in people's minds between the energy industries
and turning on the light switch,  using amplifiers,  or starting  a car.
There  is also  a school of opinion that equates  energy  use  and
the  resulting  environmental  degradation  with  growth,  and  holds
that growth is therefore not desirable. Those who hold this opinion
say  we  are  too  materialistic.  They  advocate  zero  growth,  or less
growth  at any rate.
This  whole  complex  of emotions  are  among the raw materials
which  you  as  understanders  and  proposers  of policy  must  work
with.  Some  major education  efforts about our policy problems are
probably  going to  be required  to  get us  over the hump.
A  task which  must  be  undertaken  soon  is  to extend  into land
use  the  work  that  we  have  done  in  developing  understanding
of broad  policy  issues  affecting  other resources.  We  have  made
notable  strides  in  the  past ten  years  in  developing  water  policy,
for example,  and  over  the next  five  years  I  think  we  will  pretty
well  have  developed  a  total national  policy of ethics  on how  we
will handle  water as a public  resource.
We are about in the same stage now in our air quality standards.
The battle that is now being waged between the automobile indus-
try  and  the  bureaucrats  in  Washington  and  between  the  local
utilities and  the state  regulatory  people  is  leading  to considerable
public debate. We should have pretty well laid out a national policy
on air quality  within  the next four or five years.
But we  are  not even  into  the beginning  of developing  a policy
with regard  to  land  use.  Here  we  have  the most  difficult  institu-
tional customs  to face.  We are  dealing  with very strong traditions
with  regard  to  private  property  rights.  We  also  have  extremely
strong traditions in local zoning. Township and county zoning have
been  the  rule.  The  states  are  moving  very  slowly  into  that  field.
We  are  heading now  for some  sort  of federal regulations  for  key
facilities,  and this must continue  or we  will have  a morass.
The difficulties  associated with  a nuclear plant now being built
on the Chesapeake  Bay pretty well exemplify  our situation  in land
use  policy.  The  citizenry  there  woke  up  one  day  to  learn  that
a  nuclear  plant  was  under construction.  On  inquiry,  this  turned
out  to  be  a  typical  smoke-filled  room  type  of deal.  The  utility,
Baltimore  Gas  and  Electric,  had  dealt  with  the  county  officials.
There  had  been  little  in  the  way  of  public  notice.  The  Atomic
Energy Commission  did not have  the full environmental  responsi-
12bility  it  now  holds;  it  was  not  provided  an  opportunity  to  hold
public hearings.  The citizenry  was therefore  presented  with virtu-
ally  a fait accompli. And  naturally  it reacted  as best  it could.  It
hired  an  attorney  who  happened  to  be  a  very  competent  young
fellow.  About that  time  the  National  Environmental  Policy  Act
was passed. Reaction  against the way the plant got started, a smart
attorney,  and  the  new  legislation  set  back  that  particular  plant
about four years. Similar setbacks  have occurred with other plants.
The National Environmental  Policy Act put the nuclear indus-
try  behind  in  its  otherwise  attainable  schedules  by  a  good  year
to a  year and  a  half,  which  is  very  costly.  In  the present  energy
situation  we  cannot  afford  such  delays.  We  must develop  some
way  to guarantee earlier public participation  in decisions  on siting
of key facilities.  I  am thinking here of refineries,  large  generating
plants,  and  other  facilities  that  have  a  major  public  impact.  To
accomplish  this  we will  probably  have to  look  to a federal  frame-
work  similar  to that  within  which our air  and water  quality  stan-
dards are  being developed.
We  will  also have  to develop  an  energy  conservation  policy.
During the past few years,  there has been much talk about conser-
vation  from the  administration  and  other  sources.  But  there  has
been  no action.  We really  do not  know  how  to  do it.  We  do not
know whether  we  can  develop  a conservation  ethic  that will  lead
to  voluntary  reductions  in energy  use  or,  conversely,  whether  a
major regulatory  effort  is  required  to  force  people  to curtail  their
energy use.
It  is  very  easy  to  give  lip  service  to  conservation  but  most
difficult  to  achieve  it.  The  elected  official  who  tells  us  that  we
cannot  use air conditioners  on the  hottest  summer  day,  although
it  is  all  right  on  a  cool  day,  is  not  going  to  be  re-elected.  The
Consolidated  Edison  Company  made  a  concerted  advertising
effort  to get  people to  turn  down their air  conditioners during  the
summer.  They  found  it  worked  beautifully  on  days  in  the  80's
but on that  very hot day  everybody pushed his thermostat  all  the
way over. Consolidated Edison Company's peak demand day,  the
one  they feared  would  exceed  their capacity,  was  untouched  by
their conservation  efforts.
Finally,  I  think  we  must  take  a  very  careful  look  at  reduced
growth  propositions.  Should  we,  as  a  nation  with  6  percent  of
the  world's  population,  continue  to  consume  35  percent  of  the
world's energy,  sufficient to drain in a generation  the Arabian  and
Siberian  holdings of oil?  Should  we  allow  ourselves  to knock  off
our coal  resources  in  about eighty  years?  We  talk about  them as
13being  good  enough  for  several  hundred  years,  but this  is  on  the
basis of current use and does not take into account that exponential
curve, which  is  still going up.  If we  were to  shift  all our demands
to coal resources  as we know them now,  we  would begin  to peak
after about two generations,  or about eighty  years.  Can we  afford
to  do  that?  Can  we  find  solutions  that  are  more  conservative?
What  are  our alternatives,  and  what  are  their  environmental
consequences?  If  we  shift  the  bulk  of our demand  to  coal,  we
will  use  up  land  in  a  destructive  way  and  we  will  kill  people  to
get  the  coal.  If we  get  the  bulk of our  energy  from  oil  imports,
we  will  have  spills,  and  also  some  very  heavy  debits  from  the
standpoint of foreign policy.
Consider our commerce  situation.  Our present oil imports  are
about  $4  billion  a year.  By  1980  imports  will  be up to  $20  billion
a year  on a  straight  extrapolation  of where  we  are  to  where  we
are  going.  That  means  that  net  cash  flows  will  be  going  into
countries  that  do  not  have  a  strong  incentive  for  more  money.
The  Libyans,  for  example,  do  not want dollars  and  are doubling
the price of their oil. There is a question whether we can continue
to import oil from  this  source.  If we  could import  to  1980,  could
we  import to  1985?  If we  could  import to  1985,  could  we  import
beyond  1985? At any rate,  there  are extremely  high costs in going
the import  route.  It has  the  potential of disrupting  our  monetary
flows and reducing our mobility in handling some key foreign rela-
tions.
Can  we  go  to  solar  energy?  Electrical  energy  needs  alone,
which are about 25 percent of our total energy requirements,  would
require  the dedication of about  a quarter  of the  State  of Arizona
for solar collectors.  I do not think that is an  acceptable  cost.
Do  we  want  to  go  to  geothermal  energy?  Probably  we  can
achieve some additions to our energy supplies through geothermal,
but here again we will be paying a price in terms of environmental
damage.  It will  require  the  development  not  only  of conversion
plants  but  also  of pipeline  systems  to  move  the  steam  around.
No matter what  direction  we  go,  our energy  dilemma exacer-
bates  our  environmental  problem,  given  even  the  best  of  tech-
nology.  This  brings  us  back  to  the  chief  environmental  policy
issue of the  1980's  and  1990's-the limits of growth  itself.
I recently  heard a debate  between Jake Forrester and Hermon
Kahn on this  subject.  Forrester,  as  you may know,  is  sort of the
progenitor of the Club of Rome book, The Limits to Growth, pub-
lished  about  a  year  and  a  half ago.  Based  on  an  extrapolation
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living, the book's conclusion  was that we could not sustain further
demographic or economic growth without disaster. Kahn's futuris-
tic approach,  on the other hand,  tends to be extremely optimistic.
He  thinks  that  we  need  to  set absolutely  no  limit  for  ourselves
largely  because  we  can  apply  ingenuity  to  our  broad  resources
base and just continue up the exponential  curve forever.
As  the debate  proceeded  Forrester,  not surprisingly,  took the
view  that development  meant  environmental  damage  while Kahn
maintained  that  if  we  applied  enough  ingenuity  we  could  come
up with energy  developments  which  would  actually result  in less
environmental  damage  in the aggregate  in the year  2000  than  we
have  now.  This  would  come  about  at  a price;  increased  energy
consumption,  of course,  being the price.  Then Forrester  took the
view  that  with  increased  technical  complexity  society  became
more  vulnerable.  He  mentioned  in  that context  the  exposure  of
the  United  States  to  the hijacking  of airplanes.  Kahn  contended
that  increased  complexity  made  society  more  flexible.  He  men-
tioned  the  primitive  society  of  the  Irish  potato  famine  days
and the complete  destruction of that society when one thing went
wrong.  Probably,  we  have  to score  a point for Kahn on that one.
And  finally  they  got  to  a  point  where  they  could  not  reconcile
their  views.  In  Kahn's  view,  the  world  is  not  overcrowded,  in
Forrester's  it is.
That  is  sort of the beginning  of a  debate that ought  to  go on.
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